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Contracting out is currently one of the most prevalent mechanisms of the privatization 
movement. Understanding its trends and rigorously analyzing its implications is an increasingly 
salient issue for public management research. This article builds a multi-stage theoretical 
framework addressing two broad research questions. The first is to identify the array of 
economic, political, organizational, and institutional factors that may impact a government 
agency's decision to contract out. The second is to detail the various organizational and 
environmental factors influencing contractor performance. Particular attention is paid to effective 
contract monitoring and its relationship to contractor performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In response to the government’s increasing reliance on private markets to deliver 
taxpayer-funded services, a new stream of public administration liter-ature focusing on 
governance has been developed. According to Milward and Provan[1], the study of governance 
examines coordination and collaboration within networks of government agencies and private 
organizations. Designing and managing these networks is becoming one of the central tasks for 
“the new world of devolved public policy.”[1] New governance studies explore a wide range of 
mechanisms which go beyond the traditional emphasis on authority and sanctions. In particular, 
alternative forms of service delivery have become a major focus of research. 
Contracting out is currently one of the most prevalent service delivery mechanisms that 
involve private parties. Kelman[2] defines contracting out as “a business arrangement between a 
government agency and a private entity in which the private entity promises, in exchange for 
money, to deliver certain products or services to the government agency or to others on the 
government’s behalf.” The phenomenon of contracting out is not new. However, its prevalence 
has grown significantly over the last several decades. Understanding these trends and their 
implications is an increasingly salient issue for public administration. 
This article builds a theoretical framework addressing two broad research questions. 
First, “What factors may impact a government agency’s decision to contract out a particular 
service?” Second, “What factors influence contractor performance?” To address the first issue 
we identify the array of economic, political, organizational, and institutional factors that may 
affect the decision to contract out. Secondly, we detail the various organizational and environ-
mental factors that could potentially influence contractor performance. 
The vast majority of the literature on contracting out contains normative propositions on 
why government agencies should contract out. However, very little research rigorously analyzes 
the factors that actually influence a government agency’s decision to contract out. The first 
objective of this study is to go beyond the prescriptive approach to the contracting-out decision 
and develop a model that incorporates not only market-based, but also political, institutional, and 
organizational considerations. 
Most studies on contract performance focus exclusively on comparing the cost-
effectiveness across various institutional arrangements. This article stresses the need to analyze a 
variety of possible outcomes beyond the traditional economic indicators. To address this 
limitation in the existing contracting-out literature, we propose an alternative framework that 
empha-sizes the quality of contractor performance. Specifically, the second objective of this 
study is to examine different factors that affect contractor performance. Particular attention is 
paid to effective contract monitoring and its relationship to contractor performance. 
 
Framework for Contract Decision and Performance 
 
Figure 1. Overall framework for contracting-out decision, monitoring, and performance. 
 
Our analysis is based on a literature review. Contracting out has been written about 
extensively in a number of disciplines including public admin-istration, law, business, and 
economics. We focused mainly on the body of public administration literature although we also 
briefly discuss agency and transaction cost theories in developing our framework. Our review 
primarily concentrated on literature that developed some theoretical framework for 
understanding the contracting-out decision and/or contractor performance. In addition, this 
article incorporates some empirical findings on contracting out that facilitate theory building. 
The proposed framework is not limited to the constructive synthesis of existing theories on 
contracting out. It also reflects our own understanding and analysis of some of the important 
factors related to the two research questions. 
The body of this article consists of three major sections. The first section analyzes the 
factors affecting the decision to contract out. The second and third sections are causally linked to 
each other: The second section discusses the determinants of effective contract monitoring, while 
the third section analyzes how effective monitoring, along with other factors, influence 
contractor performance. We do not examine the interdependence of different factors identified in 
our theoretical model in an exhaustive way. Our framework is only intended to serve as a broad 
foundation upon which future, more fully specified models focusing on narrower research 
questions can be based. 
 
STAGE ONE: CONTRACTING DECISION 
As discussed in the introduction, contracting out has become an increas-ingly common 
method of public service delivery. However, the extent to which different government agencies 
contract out services varies considerably. Moreover, even within the same governmental agency, 
some services are directly provided by public employees while other services are contracted out. 
The first stage of our framework is depicted in Figure 2 and identifies several factors theorized to 
influence a government agency’s decision to contract out a service. These factors are grouped 
into the four following contexts: economic, political, organizational, and institutional. As 
Hirsch[3] notes, most studies examining the contracting-out decision-making process focus 
exclu-sively on a single factor while ignoring other important causes. Our model 
 
 
Figure 2. Stage 1: Decision to contract out. 
 
attempts to fill this gap in the literature by developing a more comprehensive framework for 
studying this question. 
Numerous studies on the contracting out decision cite monetary consid-erations as a key 
factor.[4–9] The monopoly that the government commonly has on the services it produces does 
not encourage efficiency. According to economic theory, it is likely to cost a government agency 
less to contract out a service than to produce it in-house because of provider competition. In 
situations where services are contracted out, government agencies typically select contractors 
based on some type of competitive bidding process. As a result, service providers will have an 
incentive to produce the lowest-cost, best-quality services they can in order to obtain and keep 
government contracts. In a situation where a government agency is being pressured to reduce 
service delivery costs, especially in cases when economic delivery is more important than control 
and accountability,[10] policymakers may be more likely to contract out services than in 
situations that are not subject to as much pressure to reduce costs. 
In addition to monetary considerations, political factors are likely to influence a 
government agency’s decision to contract out a service. One such factor is the presence of 
political pressure on government agencies from outside groups. These outside groups may either 
support or oppose the contracting out of a particular service and have the potential to impact the 
decision-making process in both public and private forums.[11] In situa-tions where outside 
groups support contracting out, one would expect the probability of a government agency 
adopting this policy to increase. One example of an outside group that is likely to pressure 
government agencies to contract out is potential contractors. Government contracts offer this 
group a mechanism for expanding beyond their traditional markets.[12] Politicians also may 
pressure government agencies to contract out because they would like to use this policy to 
reward important constituents with lucrative government contracts.[9] On the other hand, 
pressure from public employee unions is likely to decrease the odds that this policy is 
adopted.[5] Unions frequently oppose contracting out because they fear it will result in lower 
wages for their members and will diminish the union’s influence. 
Another political factor that is likely to influence a government agency’s decision to 
contract out a service is the dominance of anti-government political ideology. In this article, 
political ideology is defined as a shared set of beliefs regarding the appropriate size and role of 
government. Anti-government political ideology refers to the political belief that “government 
should not engage in  the provision of any services that organizations in the private sector 
can and will provide”[13] As the prevalence of this ideology increases within a jurisdiction, the 
likelihood that a government agency will contract out increases as well. Contracting out allows 
government agencies to provide new services without acquiring new physical assets or hiring 
additional government workers other than those required to monitor new initiatives.[14,15] In 
addition, by contracting out services that are already provided by the government, an agency may 
be able to reduce its size. 
Organizational factors may also be considered in the contracting-out decision. For 
example, a government agency’s capacity to deliver the service in-house is important. In this 
context, capacity refers to both the human resources and physical facilities needed to provide the 
service. If a government agency evaluates itself as lacking adequate capacity, it may be more 
likely to consider contracting with private providers who have expertise in the given service. 
Both DeHoog[16] and Morgan[17] present empirical evidence supporting this argument. On the 
other hand, function should not be outsourced in cases when significant capital investments in 
equipment or facilities have already been made in the public sector.[10] 
When deciding whether to contract out a particular service, government agencies are 
likely to consider not only their capacity to provide the service but also their capacity to manage 
the entire contracting out process. Our framework includes several dimensions of a government’s 
capacity to manage contracts.[18] One consideration is whether the government agency believes 
it has the capacity to analyze information about various contract bidders. In a situation where a 
government agency lacks this capacity, one would expect that the probability that the 
government agency would select an incom-petent contractor would increase. Another important 
aspect of the capacity to manage contracts is related to monitoring contracts once the contractors 
are selected.[15,19] Contracting and procurement literature has voiced concerns about the loss of 
specialized expertise after privatization,[20] which in turn can lead to a decline in contract 
monitoring capacity. If a government agency lacks the capacity to monitor, it will be difficult for 
the government agency to hold contractors accountable for the services they provide. 
From the transaction cost economics perspective, contracting out as an economic 
transaction is associated with the costs of searching, gathering, and evaluating market 
information and the costs of creating and enforcing contractual agreements.[21] When a 
government agency lacks the capacity to manage contracts and monitor contractors, the 
transaction costs it incurs to build its capacity may actually exceed the economic benefits 
expected from contracting out. Therefore, if a government agency cannot afford the transaction 
costs involved with developing organizational capacity to manage the entire process of 
contracting out, it may opt for in-house provision of the service.[22] For these reasons, a 
government agency that lacks either selection or monitoring capacity is expected to be less likely 
to contract out services. 
In addition to the current capacity to select and monitor contractors, past experience with 
contracting out is the final dimension of capacity incor-porated into our framework. Monitoring 
contracts involves a very different set of skills than direct service provision.[6] Past experience is 
expected to indirectly impact the contracting-out decision. A government agency with 
contracting-out experience enters a new contracting relationship with first-hand knowledge about 
past successful and/or unsuccessful contracting-out strategies. Moreover, these experiences have 
given the government agency opportunities to build capacity in selecting and monitoring 
contractors. One would expect that a government agency that has had positive experiences with 
contracting out would be more confident in its ability to select and monitor contracts and 
therefore be more likely to contract out. The reverse is likely to be true in cases where the 
government agency has had negative experiences with contracting out. 
Characteristics of a service are also likely to play a role in the contracting out decision. 
Based on the contracting out literature, character-istics a government agency may consider 
include: 
1. can economies of scale be achieved; 
2. is there provider competition; 
3. is the outcome of a service easy to define and measure; 
4. is it an inherently governmental service; and 
5. is there stability of demand. 
 
 Some services require large infrastructure investments. If a contractor has the necessary 
service provision infrastructure, but a government agency lacks it, the government agency may 
decide to contract out that service in order to take advantage of economies of scale.[2,23] Due to 
different jurisdictional limits, it is likely to be easier in some cases for private-service providers 
to achieve economies of scale. Unlike government agencies, private-service providers are not 
limited to providing services within a certain political juris-diction. In a case where economies of 
scale can be achieved by providing services across different political jurisdictions, it will cost the 
government agency in one of these jurisdictions less to contract out than to produce the service 
in-house. Under these conditions, one would expect the probability that the government agency 
would contract out to increase.[3] 
As previously discussed, the assertion that contracting out is likely to cost less than 
producing in-house assumes there is provider competition. Using Van Slyke’s definition, 
provider competition exists when “a market contain[s] a range of provider alternatives from 
which government can decide who is best positioned to deliver the contract services with the 
highest quality, lowest cost, and greatest expertise.”[24] According to Domberger and 
Rimmer,[25] provider competition exists when: 
1. the government agency can identify more than one potential contractor that can 
provide high-quality services efficiently, and 
2. a competitive bidding process is used to select contractors. 
 
In order for a contractor to have an incentive to produce the lowest-cost, best-quality 
services it can, both of these conditions must be satisfied.[3,26] Therefore, in the event that at 
least one of these conditions is not met, one might expect that a government agency would be 
less likely to contract out.[18] 
Another characteristic of a service to be considered is whether it is easy to define and 
measure the outcomes. When a service has intan-gible outcomes, developing performance 
measures for the service is often more complicated.[27] Moreover, controversial performance 
measurement can compromise a government agency’s ability to hold contractors accountable for 
the services they provide. Consequently, government agencies may be more reluctant to contract 
out the services with less tangible outcomes than the services with easily measurable ones.[18] 
Another important consideration is the degree to which a particular service is considered 
to be inherently governmental or “core.” Drawing on Guttman,[28] inherently governmental 
functions in this article refer to services that have security or accountability concerns which 
make it important for government to directly oversee their delivery. Following Wilmot,[10] 
inher-ently governmental services in our model also imply functions of high strategic importance 
and those dealing with confidential information. The literature on public procurement points out 
that certain decision-making models involve a critical step of classifying activities as core or 
non-core before applying cost analysis to non-core services. Core activities are those that must 
be performed to fulfill an organization’s primary mission.[10] If a service which is considered to 
be inherently governmental or core is not adequately provided, the existence of the government 
agency responsible for this policy area could be jeopardized. Under these circumstances, one 
would expect the government agency to be more likely to provide the critical services in-house 
rather than contracting out for these services, where monitoring is more complicated. Social, 
political, and demographic changes can alter whether a particular function is considered to be 
inherently governmental. One recent example is airport security, which had not been considered 
inherently governmental before 9/11, but since then it has been nationalized. 
Stability of demand refers to the extent to which the need for a particular service 
fluctuates. Because hiring contractors as needed is easier than hiring and firing public 
employees, who are protected by the civil service system, one would expect that a government 
agency would be more likely to contract out in cases where demand for a service is unstable.[2] 
Contracting out provides the flexibility that is needed for temporary projects without requiring 
substantial, on-going financial investments. 
Finally, the institutional context of an organization is theorized to impact a government’s 
decision to contract out. In our framework, institutional factors refer to the rules and regulations 
of various government bodies that affect the environment in which a government agency 
operates. Institutional settings impose certain structures and procedures on government 
agencies.[30] As Peters[30] argues, a government agency’s institutional setting often shapes the 
policy decisions that it makes. For example, civil service rules may make it more difficult for a 
government agency to contract out services.[3,10] In addition, DeHoog[16] provides empirical 
evidence that funding regulations can impact a government’s decision to contract out services. 
 
STAGE 2: EFFECTIVE CONTRACT MONITORING 
The first stage of our framework focused on the factors affecting the decision to contract 
out. Once that decision has been made, it is also important to consider the various factors that 
impact how effectively a government agency monitors a contractor. Developing a theoretical 
framework that attempts to answer this question is the primary purpose of this section of our 
article. Effective contract monitoring is what Kettl[6] refers to as the “smart buyer” challenge for 
government when contracting out services. In order to be a smart buyer, a government agency 
must know: 
1. what service it wants to buy, 
2. who it wants to buy the service from, and 
3. the quality of what it has purchased. 
 
Agency theorists have highlighted effective contract monitoring as a critical factor 
affecting contractor performance.[1,31] With the dramatic increase in the contracting out of 
public services, understanding the factors impacting government’s effective monitoring of 
contracts is an issue that is clearly relevant to public administration scholars and practitioners. 
Yet, surprisingly little theoretical or empirical research examines this topic. One notable 
exception is Romzek and Johnston.[32] Brown and Potoski[33] also examine the issue of 
contract monitoring but focus on government’s invest-ments in this task rather than 
government’s efficacy at performing it. 
In the context of this article, the factor we are trying to explain in Stage 2, effective 
contract monitoring, refers to: 
 
1. whether the government agency collects information from contractors in a timely 
manner that accurately captures the quality and quantity of services being delivered, and 
2. whether the government agency uses the information it collects to evaluate 
contractor performance and to make programming and policy decisions. 
 
 
In Romzek and Johnston,[32] their dependent variable, contract implement tation and 
management effectiveness, refers to the design, implementation, and evaluation stages of the 
contracting process. In contrast, in our framework effective contract monitoring only involves 
the implementation and evalu-ation stages and does not include the design stage. Aspects of the 
design stage 
 
 
Figure 3. Stage 2: Effective contracting monitoring. 
 
 
such as the existence of well-designed monitoring tools and contract clarity are theorized to be 
causally linked to contract implementation and evaluation. 
Stage 2 is directly linked to Stage 1 in our framework. Specifically, we theorize that the 
contracting decision itself is likely to impact the monitoring process and hence the extent to 
which monitoring is effective. For example, if the decision to contract out was a political favor, 
one would expect this to have important implications for the monitoring process. In this 
situation, politicians may pressure bureaucrats not to scrutinize the quality of services that the 
contractor is providing and thus compromise bureaucrats’ ability to effectively monitor the 
contract. 
In addition to the contracting decision, several other factors are likely to impact its 
effectiveness in monitoring contracts. One broad set of factors included in Stage 2 of our 
framework relates to the government agency: 
 
1. past experience with contracting out, 
2. the existence of well-designed monitoring tools, 
3. agency leadership, and 
4. resource adequacy. 
 
As discussed in the first stage of our framework, past experience with contracting out 
gives the government agency opportunities to build capacity in monitoring contractors. As a 
result, a government agency with past contracting-out experience would be expected to be more 
effective at monitoring contracts than a government agency with no past contracting-out 
experience. 
A number of studies identify the existence of well-designed monitoring tools as 
impacting effective monitoring.[26,27,32] A government agency using well-designed monitoring 
tools would be more likely to collect data that accurately captures the quality and quantity of 
services being delivered than an agency using poorly-designed tools. Drawing on work by Kane 
and Lawler,[35] a well-designed measure: 
 
1. has construct validity, 
2. is reliable, 
3. has the ability to discriminate between different performance dimensions, 
4. is free from bias, and 
5. captures the totality of performance and not extraneous issues. 
 
The existence of well-designed monitoring tools is likely to be related to the type of 
service that is being contracted. As previously detailed, developing monitoring tools is often 
more complicated for services that have outcomes which are difficult to define and measure than 
it is for services that have outcomes which are easy to define and measure. Thus, the overall 
monitoring process is more difficult for the services with outcomes that are more compli-cated to 
define. 
Agency leadership has been shown to positively affect the performance of government 
agencies.[36] One would expect this same relationship to be true in the case of contracting out. 
In situations where senior management places a high priority on subordinate staff conducting 
contract monitoring activities and provides necessary guidance, we hypothesize that contract 
management would be more effective. 
One factor can be important in the context of both the contractor and government 
agencies. Resource adequacy, when used in relation to government agencies, refers to the 
availability of stable and sufficient resources for monitoring activities. Similarly, a contractor 
with adequate resources will have stable and sufficient resources available to comply with the 
government agency’s reporting requirements. The existence of adequate resources has been 
included in several theoretical models on successful policy implementation.[34,37] Moreover, 
Romzek and Johnston[32] present empirical evidence indicating that resource adequacy is an 
important factor influencing effective contract monitoring. Both the government agency and 
contractor need to have enough financial resources to be able to hire staff qualified to perform 
the required monitoring tasks and to ensure that staffing levels are adequate. Thus, the 
probability that the monitoring will be effective is likely to be higher in a case where resources 
are adequate than in a case where this condition is not satisfied. 
The other factor included in Stage 2 of our framework that relates to the contractor is 
contractor perception of monitoring requirements. We theorize that there are two different 
dimensions of contractor perception. Building on empirical findings by Bernstein,[38] one 
dimension refers to the extent to which a contractor believes that the data collected for 
monitoring purposes accurately and fully captures the quality and quantity of the services 
delivered. With respect to this dimension, contractors can be classified by whether they believe 
the data collected is a valid and reliable measure of service quality and quantity. Another 
important dimension of contractor perception relates to how the contractor believes that the 
government agency will use the information it collects when making evaluations regarding 
contractor performance. Applying the work of Jackson and Dutton,[39] performance evaluations 
can be viewed in one of four ways: 
 1. threat-consistent, 
2. opportunity-consistent, 
3. ambiguous (consistent with both opportunities and threats), or 
4. neutral (neither consistent with opportunities or threats). 
 
In terms of this dimension, contractors can range from those that view the monitoring 
requirements purely with suspicion and as threatening to those who view the monitoring process 
as purely an opportunity for constructive feedback. These perceptions are likely to affect how a 
contractor interacts with the government agency and may facilitate or hinder the contract 
monitoring process. 
The discussion in this section up to this point has focused on factors that relate to one 
organization: either the government agency or the contractor. In addition, several factors 
describing the relationship between the government agency and contractor are likely to impact 
the effective monitoring of contracts. Both Bennett and Ferlie[40] and Smith[41] discuss how 
informal, relational sanctions can be used to regulate contracts in instances where contracting 
involves complex, long-term exchanges. Key characteristics that can be used to describe a past 
relationship between a government agency and contractor include the length and quality of the 
relationship. In a situation where a government agency and contractor have a long-standing 
relationship built on mutual trust, the contractor may be compelled to satisfy contract 
requirements more out of a sense of duty rather than as adherence to the formal contract or legal 
sanctions.[40] Thus, it is likely to be easier for a government agency to monitor this type of 
relationship than a relationship that is more contentious or where mutual trust has not yet 
developed. 
The contracting-out literature identifies shared professional norms and values between 
the government agency and contractor as another factor that shapes the contracting 
process.[26,34,40] In cases where the staff from the government agency and contractor has 
received similar professional training, it is more likely that the two entities will agree on how 
services should be delivered and monitored. Furthermore, literature argues that cooperative 
norms, or shared beliefs that two parties have to work together in order to be successful in a 
relationship, are key dimensions of the government–business relationship.[10] In cases where 
there is a high degree of agreement on various critical issues, monitoring would be expected to 
be easier for the government agency. 
Goal consensus is closely related to the existence of shared professional norms and 
values. There are two important components of goal consensus identified in the general literature 
on policy implementation: goal clarity and goal agreement.[34,37,44–46] A necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for goal consensus is that the goal of the contracting relationship must be 
clear to both the government agency and contractor. Matland[44] asserts that ambiguous policies 
hamper monitoring the policy implementation process and the establishment of accountability 
mechanisms. Assuming that the goal of the contracting relationship is clear, there must also be 
agreement between the government agency and contractor that the goal is appropriate for goal 
consensus to exist. Shared professional norms and values are likely to enhance the probability 
that a government agency and contractor will agree on contract goals. 
Goal consensus is expected to increase the odds that a government agency’s monitoring 
will be effective for two reasons. In situations where there is goal consensus, the likelihood of 
communication problems between the government agency and contractor is reduced. It is also 
likely to be easier to create monitoring tools that both the government agency and contractor 
believe accurately capture the quality and quantity of services being delivered. 
In addition to being a key component of goal consensus, clarity is likely to matter in 
terms of what a contract specifically says. Agency theory focuses on the agency relationship in 
which one party (the principal) delegates a task to another party (the agent). According to agency 
theory, problems can arise with this arrangement when the goals of the principal and agent 
conflict and when it is difficult or costly for the principal to monitor the activities of the 
agent.[47] Under these conditions, there is an informational asymmetry between the principal 
and agent, and the government agency’s ability to monitor the contractor is hampered.[21,48] 
However, contract clarity can reduce the impact of this informational asymmetry on the 
contracting relationship. Monitoring contracts in which the service delivery mechanisms and 
outcome measures are clearly stated is likely to be straightforward because it will be easy to tell 
if contractors are “shirking” their responsibilities. 
The complexity of the organizational structure for delivering services should also be 
considered. In many cases, a government agency is contracting out a whole service system, and 
the contractor must set up a network that jointly delivers services to clients with multiple 
problems.[1] The complexity of the organizational structure for delivering services will impact 
how easily information regarding contractor performance can be transmitted to the government 
agency. This may result in variations in the government’s contract monitoring effectiveness, as 
one would expect that monitoring a joint production function would be much more difficult than 
monitoring the work of a single organization. As Romzek and Johnston’s work[32] highlights, 
one aspect of the organizational structure for delivering services that is particu-larly relevant 
when considering complexity is the number of subcontractors involved in the contracting 
relationship. Subcontractors are directly respon-sible to the contractor, not the government. As a 
result, it is likely to be more difficult for the government to assess whether the information 
collected from a subcontractor accurately captures the quality and quantity of services they are 
providing. Moreover, the only leverage that a government has to sanction a subcontractor is 
indirectly through the contractor. 
A final characteristic of the relationship between a government agency and contractor 
included in our framework is the geographical proximity between the two entities. In cases 
where there is a significant distance separating the two, it will be logistically more challenging 
for the government to monitor the contractor’s activities. There will be less opportunity for face-
to-face communication. This may increase the likelihood of misunder-standings. In addition, 
certain monitoring techniques such as unannounced site visits are not very feasible. 
Market conditions of the service are also likely to influence how effective a government 
agency is at monitoring a contractor. According to Romzek and Johnston,[32] greater provider 
competition will enhance a government agency’s ability to monitor a contractor. Under 
conditions of greater provider competition, Romzek and Johnston argue that a contractor will be 
more likely to comply with reporting procedures because it will be more fearful of losing its 
contract if it does not comply. General market conditions of a service are another consideration. 
If there is an overall decline in revenues for an entire service sector, agencies in this sector are 
likely to have incentive to reorganize the distribution of their expenses in such a way that the 
cuts they have to make are minimized. An obvious way for agencies to do this is to shift as many 
of their expenses as possible so that they will be covered by remaining funding sources. As a 
result, agencies in this sector may try to receive government reimbursement for activities that 
were not intended to be covered by government contracts. As a result of these incentives, 
knowledge of declining revenues for an entire sector may prompt a government agency to 
monitor contracts with agencies in that sector more closely. 
The last factor included in the second stage of our framework is political pressure. Client 
advocacy groups and politicians frequently pressure government agencies to improve the quality 
and quantity of services being delivered within a particular policy area. In highly politicized 
environments where a contractor provides the service being scrutinized, a government agency 
may decide to increase their monitoring efforts in hopes of improving service delivery outcomes. 
Alternatively, political pressure from outside groups has the potential to decrease monitoring 
efforts. In some cases, contractors are very powerful politically and are closely aligned with 
client advocacy groups. Under these circumstances, client advocacy groups may pressure 
politicians to reduce monitoring efforts.[32] 
STAGE THREE: CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE 
In the discussion of the first stage of our framework we analyzed several factors affecting 
the decision to contract out. Many of these factors directly translate into the goals that 
government agencies pursue. This section presents a theoretical framework for understanding 
contractor performance, the degree to which these goals are achieved. The conceptual tool that 
we offer may be useful for researchers who attempt to verify whether various economic or 
ideological arguments for contracting out are actually justified in practice. The first portion of 
this section reviews the current approaches found in the literature and proposes an alternative 
framework. The remainder of the section details a number of factors that are likely to impact 
contractor performance. 
A large part of empirical literature on contractor performance focuses on a single 
outcome: cost-effectiveness. Some authors support the assumption that contracting out generally 
leads to noticeable cost savings.[8,25,49] Others argue that due to methodological limitations, 
the actual cost-savings from the private provision of services are not clear and may be 
overstated.[15,24,50,51] Almost uniformly, the latter group of researchers point out that the 
impact of contracting out on service quality is uncertain. According to Cooper,[52] efficiency 
considerations are commonly reduced to comparing the amount of input to the amount of output, 
rather than to the quality of output. However, the “bottom line is not simply about quantity but 
also quality.”[52] Methodological obstacles in examining contractors’ performance include the 
absence of relevant control variables in the analyses,[49,50] lack of pre-tests and pre-
assessments,[53] samples suffering from selection biases,[51] inadequate outcomes 
measurement,[51] lack of consideration of tax consequences,[51] and other hidden costs.[15] In 
fairness to this issue, the methodological problems in assessing the impact of contracting out are 
not uncommon for most other public-sector restructuring exercises, such as marketization, 
agencification, and privatization. 
Our framework separates contractor performance into three dimensions: structure, 
process, and outcomes. This approach is based on the framework for quality assessment 
originally proposed by Donabedian.[54] While the use of Donabedian’s framework has been 
primarily limited to evaluating the quality of healthcare, the framework could also be applied to 
the perfor-mance of any public programs. In Donabedian’s framework, structure refers to service 
delivery inputs. A government agency can evaluate contractor performance by monitoring the 
extent to which the contractor uses the inputs mentioned in the contract. Examples of inputs 
likely to be monitored include contractor personnel and facilities. With respect to process, 
contractors can be evaluated in terms of whether services are delivered in a way that is consistent 
with contract conditions and accepted professional norms. Another important dimension of 
quality relates to outcomes. In the literature applying Donabedian’s framework, outcomes refer 
to the extent to which the “good events” rather than “bad events” occur. This framework has 
been adopted not only in healthcare literature but also in the field of procurement.[55] Applying 
this general definition to contracting out, “good events” in our framework refer to the extent to 
which a contractor achieves general and specific service delivery objectives. On the other hand, 
“bad events” occur when the contract results in negative consequences. 
By viewing structure and process apart from outcomes, it is possible to separate aspects 
of quality that are closely related to provider compliance with contract requirements from those 
that depend on additional factors. Complying with structure and process requirements increases 
the likelihood of good outcomes but does not assure them.[56] When considering this framework 
as a tool for evaluating the quality aspects of contractor performance, the measure for the 
structure and process are mostly service-specific. Drawing on Kane,[57] outcomes can be 
separated into two large classes: “specific” and “global.” The specific measures often relate to 
the concrete changes in client behavior and status. Some of the global measures of outcomes 
discussed below pertain to the overall “societal” impacts of the contract. In fact, most of them 
can be easily translated into more concrete and specific measures. 
One example of the global outcome measures is cost-effectiveness, mentioned earlier in 
our discussion. Cost-effectiveness is one of the most common outcomes considered by the 
researchers and practitioners when evaluating contractor performance. One important caveat is 
that for a contract to be considered cost-effective it must be cost-effective for both the contractor 
and the government agency. Such assessments should not disregard the trans-action costs 
incurred by the government to examine contractor performance. While cost-effectiveness can be 
considered to be a global measure, it can also be translated into multiple specific measures of 
cost-effectiveness for each concrete component of the service delivery. 
The “global” outcome measures of contractor performance should not be limited to only 
cost-effectiveness considerations. There are other outcome measures that are found in the 
literature and need closer consideration. Such measures include responsiveness to 
consumers,[49,52] equity and distributional concerns,[49,51,52] responsibility,[52] community 
economic development,[24] and client satisfaction.[1] We are not going to consider these 
measures in depth in this text. Our goal is simply to look for the concepts that fit with our 
understanding of the global outcome measures, and point out the necessity of their further 
explication and operationalization. 
The current theoretical literature tends to compare program performance for services that 
are contracted out with services provided by the government. In contrast, our discussion of this 
stage focuses on the likely impact of various factors within the existing contracting context. In 
other words, our emphasis is on the different factors that are likely to improve contractor 
performance once the contracting arrangement has been made. However, this does not mean that 
our framework cannot be used to make comparisons across different service delivery methods. 
Such comparisons can be made by examining samples with both types of arrangements and 
including a dummy variable for “contracting” as a control variable. 
Several factors are likely to affect contractor performance and are depicted in Figure 4. 
The third stage of our framework is a logical extension of the second stage, as the second stage’s 
dependent variable, effective monitoring, becomes one of the factors explaining contractor 
performance in Stage 3. Based on agency theory, effective monitoring minimizes the possibility 
that the government agency will face moral hazard or adverse selection.[31] If information that 
allows the principal to monitor the agent’s activities is available, the likelihood the agent will 
behave in the way that principals want increases because it will be more difficult for the agent to 
deceive the principal.[47,58,59] Following the agency theory, many theorists of contracting warn 
against over-reliance on market mechanisms and argue that the capacity to monitor service 
provision by collecting and evaluating perfor-mance data and providing appropriate feedback is 
critical.[1,6,33,55,60] Some empirical evidence suggests that contractors may often view 
government monitoring as micromanagement, a disruptive and dysfunctional intrusion into the 
process of implementation.[38,61] However, in many cases effective monitoring is viewed by 
contractors as an important tool that forces the providers to think in terms of results.[38] 
While effective government monitoring can enhance contract outcomes, it is the 
contractors who are ultimately responsible for service delivery. 
 
 
Figure 4. Stage 3: Contractor performance. 
 
As a consequence, Stage 3 includes factors that are related to contractor capacity. As detailed in 
Stage 2, the existence of adequate resources for service delivery is likely to be critical for 
successful program implemen-tation. Empirical research suggests that well-funded systems 
operate better.[1] Cash-flow problems can hamper the ability of a contractor to purchase the 
personnel, facilities and technology needed to deliver adequate services.[34] Importantly, 
adequacy of resources should be assessed with respect to the volume of the output such as the 
number of clients. In other words, what may be considered an adequate funding for 50 units of 
output may not necessarily be adequate for 500 units of output. 
In addition to having stable and sufficient resources, contractors must have adequate 
administrative capacity in order to ensure that resources are efficiently distributed. Contracting 
arrangements often entail more complex personnel and project management due to the new tasks 
performed by the organization. As a result, the complexity of administration in agencies 
receiving government contracts is likely to increase. One would expect that contractor 
performance would be better in agencies with sufficient adminis-trative capacity than in agencies 
that lack such capacity.[34] 
Another set of factors that affect contractor performance relates to the government–
contractor relationship. As described in the preceding section, past relationships, as well as the 
existence of shared professional values, may compel some contractors to satisfy contract 
requirements more than the fear of adverse sanctions. Both of these variables are also theorized 
to directly affect contractor performance. 
Kelman[42] argues that the existence of long-term relationships between government and 
contractors fosters transaction-specific investments. Through repeated interactions, contractors 
learn about the government’s service delivery system and may offer helpful suggestions for how 
service delivery can be improved. These improvements, in turn, may positively impact contractor 
performance. Moreover, partnerships with long and productive histories are likely to foster 
informal ties and a sense of responsibility and obligation between organizations that will 
stimulate contractor performance. Such relationships may impact performance even in the 
absence of close monitoring. Supporting this argument, Milward and Provan’s pioneering work 
on four mental health networks finds that stability was in fact more important than resources. 
Their analysis shows that one of the poorly-funded systems in fact performed better than one of 
the well-funded systems, which was going through a period of instability and readjustment. In 
the latter system, insta-bility was likely to result in ineffectiveness before improvement was seen. 
For the same reason, bidding out frequently may save some money, but it may be destructive to 
system stability and, by extension, performance.[1,62] 
In addition, even in the absence of prolonged relationships, two organi-zations having 
similar professional values will be more likely to have the same understanding of various facets 
of service provision. Consequently, contractors in these types of contracting relationships will be 
more likely to perform according to the government agency’s expectations. 
The previous section has discussed how goal consensus can reduce communication 
problems and enhance the likelihood of agreement regarding monitoring tools. Similarly, goal 
consensus is expected to directly affect contractor performance. For example, due to the 
information asymmetry between the principals and agents, the government agency may prioritize 
global goals, such as equity and empowerment. On the other hand, the contractor may focus on 
more specific objectives stated in the contract such as changing behavior and improving clients’ 
status, objectives that do not necessarily empower or redistribute resources. As a result, lack of 
goal consensus is likely to produce results that are not adequate for at least one side of the 
relationship. 
Another factor included in both the second and third stages of our framework is contract 
clarity. In cases where a contract is clearly written, it will be easier for the contractor to 
understand the government agency’s expectations regarding the process, structure, and 
outcomes. In the absence of a clearly written contract, one would expect a contractor to more 
likely to be guided by its own understanding of programmatic goals, which may not necessarily 
reflect those of the government agency. However, the lack of a clearly written contract does not 
inevitably result in negative conse-quences. Literature points out that the role of written contracts 
may be quite limited compared to the interorganizational embeddedness and social relations 
between organizations.[63] For example, psychological contracts are a legitimate way of 
regulating partnerships through unwritten and mainly unspoken assumptions and expectations as 
opposed to clearly written formal documents.[64,65] Such informal and sometimes quite vague 
contracts may be a result of the problem inherent in the principal-agent relationship: inability to 
anticipate all conditions and behavior of the agent. This factor, combined with the lack of goal 
clarity in many public services, may in fact discourage having much clarity in written contracts. 
In addition, the presence of rewards and penalties in the contract can impact contractor 
performance. The effectiveness of “incentivizing” contractor performance is confirmed 
empirically and substantiated by a variety of organizational theories, such as resource 
dependence theory, transaction costs economics theory, corporate social responsibility theory, 
and others.[66] Incorporating performance appraisal into the contract through appropriate 
rewards and penalties serves as an incentive mechanism positively affecting contractor 
performance by aligning the goals of the contractor and the government agency.[18] The idea of 
performance-based incentives has been attached to many public-sector reforms around the world. 
The last broad category of factors likely to influence contractor perfor-mance is market 
conditions. The concept of market is approached quite broadly here. It incorporates the client 
characteristics, competition, and general market trends Client/population characteristics is the 
first environmental factor affecting contractor performance. Our understanding of client 
population characteristics is close to the concept of “case-mix” in the healthcare literature. 
Imagine two very similar contractors delivering the same service to two different populations. 
Naturally, the contractor that serves a more disadvan-taged and “difficult” group of clients would 
have a harder time achieving the same level of outcomes than its counterpart. The population that 
is financially and educationally more vulnerable is likely to require more attention, effort, and 
varied levels of services tied to their extraordinary needs. 
In addition to enhancing the likelihood of effective monitoring, provider competition can 
directly impact contractor performance. In an industry with multiple competitors, one would 
expect a contractor to be more mindful of a government agency’s ability to hire another 
contractor in case of an inadequate outcome. As a result, provider competition is likely to 
stimulate better contractor performance. 
The final factor included in our framework is general market conditions. As previously 
discussed, an overall decline in revenues for a particular market sector may result in agencies in 
this sector trying to receive government reimbursement for activities that were not intended to be 
covered by government contracts. As a result, there will be fewer resources available to meet 
contract requirements, and this is expected to seriously jeopardize contractor performance. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Currently, public agencies are intensively experimenting with various alter-native forms 
of service delivery. Ingraham[67] argues that it has become typical for the government to apply 
private-sector strategies for public-sector solutions. Meanwhile, the literature calls for more 
attention to clear problem specification, examination of the causal linkages, and good assessment 
of the likelihood of success in order to enhance the effec-tiveness of various policy transfers 
from one unit of government to another and from the private to public sector.[67] Focusing on 
one of the most prevalent alternative service delivery mechanisms, this study found that very 
little research comprehensively analyzes the rationale for its adoption. Our article attempts to 
integrate the existing theoretical explanations of the contracting decision into a theoretical 
framework, distinguishing the role of institutional forces, political, or organizational factors in 
the decision to contract out. 
In addition to examining the predictors of contracting decision, we focus on its outcomes. 
Commenting on the results of the privatization, Rainey and Steinbauer[68] note that the 
assessments of the privatization initiatives commonly find more modest results than the ones 
projected by the propo-nents of privatization. The evaluations of contracting-out practices share 
the same sense of disappointment and uncertainty. In order to cope with the new role of 
government agencies, research highlights the importance of building government capacity to 
better coordinate and evaluate program implementation.[69] In our framework we link an 
increasingly important aspect of government capacity, effective contract monitoring, with 
contractor perfor-mance. We detail the factors that contribute to the effective monitoring of 
public contracts and argue that their presence is as important as the role of competition and 
contractor capacity. 
Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill[70] point out that governance research encom-passes three 
levels of government: institutional, managerial, and technical. The new governance approach 
provides an alternative to the prevailing focus on management in the public administration 
literature. Our framework attempts to bring together factors that influence contracting practices 
on all three levels mentioned by Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill. The framework is intended to allow 
researchers to think more broadly about the contracting questions and see the connections 
between the initiation of the restructuring process and the outcomes of contracting out. 
The broad theoretical model presented in this article may offer a useful framework for 
guiding future research on contracting out. The next logical step in applying our framework is to 
propose specific hypotheses on inter-dependencies among different factors. For instance, in 
Stage 1, viewing the contracting decision as a multi-phase process may generate hypotheses on 
how different factors impact different phases of that process. In the agenda-setting phase, 
decision makers select, define and focus on particular problems.[71] Organizational politics and 
ideology often determine restructuring priorities, while budgetary constraints motivate managers 
to explore various forms of privatization. Therefore, monetary considerations and the political 
context of the contracting-out decision may have a stronger impact in this phase of the 
policymaking process than other factors. Once contracting out is placed on the agenda, the phase 
of policy formulation follows in which public officials explore various policy options and 
formulate alternative policies.[71,72] The organizational context may have especially strong 
impact in this phase of contracting decision. This happens because managers’ perception of 
various capacities influences the way they explore policy options and formulate policy 
alternatives. After a contracting-out proposal is designed, a decision regarding whether the 
proposal is adopted is typically made. During this phase, it is critical that the proposal is 
supported by the majority of the stakeholders[7,72] and does not conflict with the current 
regulations. In situa-tions where there is political pressure to contract out and when the proposal 
is consistent with any institutional constraints, the likelihood that the proposal will be adopted 
increases. This is an example of just one of the many interesting sets of hypotheses that can be 
generated based on our model. 
 
Additional possible areas for further research on this topic may include: 
1. examining other interdependencies among various factors, 
2. applying general concepts to specific policy areas and proposing other interesting 
hypotheses,  
3. testing models that control for the range of factors identified in this study, and 
4. further specifying our theories by examining the comparative impact of various 
factors, including specifying theories for specific policy areas. 
 
We recognize that empirically testing this model is likely to pose major difficulties. 
Examples of the difficulties that may be posed include the opera-tionalization of the concepts, 
data collection, and potential endogeneity biases. Most of the phenomena discussed in this 
article, such as political pressure, political ideology, and various aspects of contract outcomes 
still need to be carefully specified and defined. Some constructs, such as well-designed 
monitoring tools, may be best operationalized by using both subjective, perception-based 
measures and objective measures based on specific theoreti-cally substantiated criteria. It may 
also be challenging to collect the necessary data needed to empirically test our framework. For 
example, collecting data on stakeholders’ involvement in the contracting process and non-
monetary contract outcomes may prove to be daunting. One of the data sources produced and 
utilized by researchers to answer questions similar to the ones discussed in this paper is The 
Alternative Service Delivery in Local Government data, collected as a part of the International 
City Management Association surveys.[73] The richness of the context and multiple levels of 
data sources 3 should perhaps encourage the use of a combination of qualitative and quanti-tative 
methods in such research. 
When specifying quantitative models, researchers should be cautious of the recursive 
relationships and complex interdependencies that are inherent to our theory. As a result, 
researchers may be confronted with the need to use more sophisticated statistical techniques to 
identify the magnitude of the association, such as the association between contractor 
performance and past government/contractor relationship. Furthermore, due to the complexity of 
the framework, the most feasible solution may be to focus on testing only limited parts of the 
larger framework. However, it is important that they acknowledge the limitations of such narrow 
approaches. 
In addition to greater in-depth examination of the questions on which we focused in this article, 
future research could examine other important questions associated with contracting public 
services. We focused on just two aspects of the contracting-out process: 
 
1. why government agencies decide to contract out services, and 
2. why contractor performance varies. 
 
In addition to these “why” questions, questions that ask “how” are also important. 
Specifically, further research is needed to describe the growth of contracting out and how it 
varies across different services within the public sector. Other areas of research include exploring 
how the role of managers in government agencies and the relationship between government 
agencies and private organizations change as contracting out becomes more widespread. 
Answering all of these questions will not only improve our understanding of the contracting-out 
process but also clarify the role of this new service delivery mechanism in the larger governance 
paradigm. 
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